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A bstract

In a traditional certificate based public key cryp
tography, a key generation procedure invariantly
contains a function F , where the public key PIC
is defined in terms of the secret key SIC as VIC =
F(S1C), where F is an efficient and one-way func
tion that maps from the private key space to the
public key space. Due to the one-wayness of the
function F , the public key VIC always contains a
part that looks random. In practice, verification of
a user’s public key is certified with a certificate is
sued by a certification authority (CA). Any partic
ipant who would like to use a public key must first
verify the correctness of the corresponding certifi
cate to ensure the validity of the public key. Nev
ertheless, this issue has lead into a different prob
lem called trust relationship, when many CAs are
involved. Public key infrastructure (P K I) is an im
portant infrastructure that is used to manage the
trust relationship between entities in a hierarchical
manner. As a consequence, certificate-based public
key cryptosystems require a large amount of storage
and computing time to store and verify certificates.

Security of computer networks normally relies on a
trusted authority who is responsible for setting up
the system and distributing cryptographic keys. If
the trusted authority is compromised due to an at
tack, then the security of the entire system will be
compromised. In this paper, we will look into this
issue in terms of identity-based (or ID-based) cryp
tography. Since the introduction of identity-based
(or ID-based) cryptography in 1984 by Shamir, IDbased cryptography has attracted many research
due to its simplicity. However, ID-based cryptogra
phy suffers from several drawbacks, namely the re
quirement of having a secure channel during the key
extraction and a complete trust to be placed on a
trusted authority (or a so-called Private Key Gener
ator PKG). In this paper, we overcome these prob
lems by proposing a new key extraction algorithm
that does not have these two limitations. We are
only concentrating on the key extraction problem
and hence, our schemes are applicable in any other
ID-based scheme that has similar structure, such as
In [13], Shamir suggested that the public keys
Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption scheme, etc.
are chosen from the users’ identities, such as eKeywords: ID-based cryptography, bilinear pairing,
mail address, IP address, etc. and hence, it is
key extraction.
named an identity-based public-key cryptography
(or ID-based cryptography, for short). In an IDbased cryptography, the private key is computed
by a key extraction algorithm, which is defined as
In computer networks, the communications among SIC = F(master-key, ID). Note that the ID is the
nodes should be protected against various attacks. public key VIC in a traditional public key cryptog
To ensure a sound protection, various crypto raphy. The so-called master-key is the long term
graphic methods can be deployed and some secure secret key that is owned by the Private Key Gener
cryptographic-key distribution mechanisms should ator (P K G ). Note that since ID is used to replace
be applied. However, such methods and mecha the usual public key, then the authenticity of the
nisms usually rely on a trusted network authority public key is no longer a problem. However, there
who may be a certificate authority responsible for is a new protocol introduced in this system, called
setting up the system and/or distributing crypto the key extraction algorithm, which is a service of
graphic keys. The obvious concern is that the en fered by a trusted P K G to system wide users. This
tire system could be compromised if the trusted au service is essentially an authentication service: the
thority is compromised due to an attack from ad resulting private key from this algorithm provides
versaries.
the key owner with a credential for his/her ID-based

1 Introduction

public key to be recognized and used by other users
in the system. Essentially, before the secret key for
an identity is released, the P K G must conduct a
thorough check of the identity information of the
user. This check may include some physical means
of identification, which is similar to the identifica
tion check before a CA issues a public key certificate
to a user in a traditional public key cryptography
setting.
In the same paper [13], Shamir provided a con
crete ID-based signature scheme, but he questioned
the existence of an ID-based encryption (IBE)
scheme. It was not known whether IBE scheme
exists, until shown recently by Boneh and Franklin
that an efficient IBE can be constructed from bilin
ear pairings on “weak” elliptic curves [2], Interest
ingly, the key extraction algorithm in [2] is known
later on as a short signature scheme based on bilin
ear pairing [3].
Problems with ID-based Cryptography
Despite of all the nice features that ID-based cryp
tography can offer, ID-based cryptography suffers
from several drawbacks.
Firstly, an inherent problem in ID-based cryp
tography is the key escrow problem. Since all user’s
private keys are generated by the P K G , they must
place an absolute trust to the P K G . The trust
must be absolute, complete and unconditional. Es
sentially, this means that the PKG can read all the
private communications or forge all of their signa
tures. Hence, as noted by Shamir in his seminal pa
per in [13], ID-based cryptography is suitable in a
closed environment, for example in an organization
environment in which the employer has the com
plete ownership of the information communicated
to and from the employees, then the employer can
play the role of P K G .
We note that this is not a new issue. This prob
lem has been addressed in several work in the lit
erature by employing multiple authority approach
[2, 5] or by using some user-chosen secret infor
mation [1, 14, 7, 10], It was noted in [2] that if
the master-key is distributed to multiple P K G s and
a private key is computed in a threshold manner,
then the key escrow problem of a single P K G can
be prevented. However, in practice, having many
P K G s who will generate a secret key to a user is
quite a burden. A different approach by generating
a new private key by adding multiple private keys
was proposed in [5], Nevertheless, in this scheme,
P K G s have no countermeasure against user’s ille
gal usage. A certificate-based encryption (and later,
signature scheme) was proposed by Gentry in [7],
In this scheme, the user’s secret key is computed
by adding some user-chosen secret information, but
in fact, it becomes a certificate-based scheme losing
the advantage of ID-based cryptography. Similar,

but different, approach was taken by Al-Riyami and
Paterson in [1] by proposing a certificateless cryp
tography. In certificateless cryptography, the need
of certificate has been completely removed. After
the key extraction algorithm is invoked (by an in
teractive protocol between the P K G and the user),
the user needs to add his user-chosen secret infor
mation and later on, publish his public key. Again,
in this scheme, the advantage of ID-based cryptog
raphy has been removed since the public key is re
quired to be published by the user. In a more re
cent work by Lee et. al. [11], the secret key is
constructed by a P K G together with several key
privacy authorities (KPAs). In practice, this ap
proach is not very practical.
The second problem in ID-based cryptography is
still related to the key extraction protocol, namely
the requirement to have a secure channel between
the P K G and the user during the protocol. We
note that the resulting key extracted from this pro
tocol is the secret key that is only known by the
user. If this key is somehow leaked, then anyone
can either sign on behalf of the user or read the
message intended to the user. Therefore, the ex
istence of a secure channel between the P K G and
the user is essential. In practice, a secure channel
needs to be established by using a public key in
frastructure, and hence, it returns to the problem
of having a traditional cryptosystem (by requiring
each party to provide certificate, etc.). This prob
lem has recently been addressed Sui et. al. [6], and
their proposed solution is by adding randomness to
the identity that is sent by the user during the key
extraction algorithm. However, we note that this
approach is not practical and somehow it violates
the idea of the key extraction algorithm itself. As
noted earlier, in the key extraction algorithm, the
P K G needs to identify the correctness of the ID,
and in the approach that was taken in [6], the P K G
cannot verify the authenticity of the ID since the in
formation that is sent by the user is randomized.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we revisit the notion of key extraction
algorithm and solve the two existing problems in
ID-based cryptography mentioned in the previous
section. In particular, our key extraction algorithm
will not require the user to place his/her trust to a
single P K G and more importantly, our key extrac
tion algorithm does not require the existence of a
secure channel. Moreover, our key extraction algo
rithm will work with any previously known schemes,
such as Boneh-Franklin’s IBE scheme [2]. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that
solves the two problems in ID-based cryptography
at the same time.
Organization of The Paper
In the next section, we provide some required back

ground concepts and some related works in this
area. Then, we describe our key extraction algo
rithm in stages. In section 3, we describe our first
key extraction protocol. In this protocol, we have
successfully removed the need of a secure channel.
However, the P K G ’s key escrow problem still ex
ists. In section 4, we improve our first scheme by
removing escrowing problem. The only assumption
that we make is the P K G s will not collude against
the user. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Prelim inaries

and cP (for unknown randomly chosen o, b, c
compute e(P, P ) abc.

D efinition 2 D ecision al
(D D H ) P roblem .

G

7Z-q),

D iffle-H ellm an

Given a randomly chosen P G G i, as well as
aP,bP,cP, for some a,b,c G 2 *, decide whether
7

e = ab holds with equality.
It is well-known that DDH problem in Gi is easy, by
performing MOV reduction, that states the discrete
logarithm problem (D LP) in Gi is no harder than
the DLP in G2.

In this section, we briefly review the basic concepts
on bilinear pairing together with some complexity
assumptions, while introducing the notations used
throughout this paper.

D efinition 3 D ecision al B ilinear
H ellm an (D B D H ) P roblem .

2.1 Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pair
ings

r G G m, decide whether r = e { P ,P )abc holds with
equality.

Let G i,G 2 be cyclic additive groups generated by
P i , P 2 , respectively, whose order are a prime q. Let
Gm be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same
order q. We assume there is an isomorphism tjj :
G2 —> Gi such that i/j(P2 ) = Pi- Let e : Gi x
G2 —>Gm be a bilinear mapping with the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP,bQ) = e (P ,Q )ab for all P €
Gi, Q G G2, a, b, G TLq.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P
such that e(P, Q) ^ 1.

G

Gi, Q

G

Diffle-

Given a randomly chosen P G G i, as well as
aP, bP, cP and r, fo r some a, b, c, G 2 * and

D efinition 4 D ecision al H ash B ilinear DiffleH ellm an (D H B D H ) P roblem .
Given a randomly chosen P G G i, as well as
a P ,b P ,cP and r, fo r some a,b ,c,r € 2 *, decide
whether r = h(e(P, P ) abc), where h : G m —> 2*,
holds with equality.

D efinition 5 D ecision al H ash B ilinear DiffleH ellm an A ssum ption.

I f IQ is a DHBDH parameter generator, the
advantage Advip(A) that an algorithm A has
G2
in solving the DHBDH problem is defined to
be the probability that the algorithm A outputs

3. Computability: There exists an efficient algo
rithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P G Gi, Q G
G2.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set Gi = G2 and P i =
P2. We note that our scheme can be easily modified
for a general case, when G i A G2.
A Bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as
a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm IQ that
takes as input a security parameter £ and returns a
uniformly random tuple par am = (p , Gi, Cm, e, P )
of bilinear parameters, including a prime number
p of size I, a cyclic additive group Gi of order q,
a multiplicative group G m of order q, a bilinear
map e : G i x Gi —>
and a generator P of Gi.
For a group G of prime order, we denote the set
G* = G \ {O } where O is the identity element of
the group.

2.2 Com plexity A ssum ptions
D efinition 1 B ilinear D iffle-H eilm an (B D H )
P roblem .
Given a randomly chosen P g G i, as well as aP, bP

“yes” when r = h (e (P ,P )abc) holds on inputs
Gi, Gjif, e, P, aP, bP, cP , where (G i,G jf,e ) is the
output of IQ fo r sufficiently large security parame
ter I, P is a random generator of Gi and a, b, c are
random elements of ~2Lq and h : G m —■' 2 *. The
DHBDH assumption is that kd.VjgBDH (A ) is neg
ligible for all efficient algorithms A.

2.3 Boneh-Franklin’s ID-based En
cryption Scheme
Using the bilinear pairing, an ID-based encryption
(IBE) scheme can be designed. For completeness,
we review the construction of an IBE scheme due
to Boneh-Franklin [2] as follows.
In general, there are four algorithms in ID-based
cryptosystem as follows.
• Setup. A deterministic algorithm that is run
by a trusted authority to generate global sys
tem parameters and master key.
• Extract. A deterministic algorithm that is
run by a trusted authority on inputting the

master key together with an arbitrary bit string
ID g {0 ,1 }*, to generate the user’s private key
<Sid- That is, <Sid <— Extract(ID).
• Encrypt. A probabilistic algorithm that en
crypts a message under the public identity ID.
That is, C <— IDEncrypt(m, ID).
• Decrypt. A deterministic algorithm that re
ceives a ciphertext and a private key <S|d , to
generate the corresponding plaintext. That is,
m <— IDDecrypt(C, <Sid).

The ID-based cryptosystem proposed by Boneh
and Franklin is as follows.
• Setup. P K G generates two groups (O i,+ )
and (G m ,-) ° f prime order q and a mapping
pair e : ( G i, + )2 —> (G m ,-)- He also selects
an arbitrary generator P € Gi. Then, he
picks s € Z 9 and set Ppub = sP, where s
denotes the master key. Finally, two cryptographically strong hash functions are selected:
F : {0 ,1 }* —> Gi, H : Gm —* {0 ,1 }", where n
denote the size of the plaintext message space.
The system parameters and their descriptions
are (G i, GM, e, q, P, Ppub, F, H ) .
• Extract. After performing physical identifica
tion of Bob and making sure the uniqueness of
ID, P K G generates Bob’s secret key as follows.
P K G computes Q = P(ID ) and <S|d = sQ. <S|d
is Bob’s secret key.
• Encrypt. To send an encrypted message to
Bob, Alice first obtains the system parame
ter and Bob’s identity to compute Q = P(ID).
Then, to encrypt a message m 6 {0 ,1 }", Alice
picks r e Z q and computes g\Q = e(Q, r P pub)
and C = ( r P ,m ® H(g\o))- The ciphertext is
C = (rP, m © H (pid ))• Decrypt. Let C = (U, V ) be a ciphertext re
ceived by Bob. To decrypt C using his private
key <S|d, Bob computes V © H(e(S\o, U )).
The security of this scheme relies on BDH assump
tion in the random oracle model [2].
In this paper, we are concentrating on the key
extraction algorithm Extract. We aim to demon
strate a key extraction algorithm that does not suf
fer from the problems mentioned above. To the best
of our knowledge, our scheme is the first scheme
that offers a key extraction algorithm without hav
ing the two problems mentioned earlier.

3 The Basic Schem e
In this section, we present our basic key extraction
algorithm that preserves the advantages of ID-based
cryptography. Intuitively, our scheme works as fol
lows. There are two P K G s in the system. It is
assumed that the P K G s will not collude against
the user. Each user needs to visit both P K G s to
obtain his/her secret key (via the key extraction al
gorithm). The secret key is delivered by the P K G
to the user via a public channel (and hence, no se
cure channel required). We employ the technique
from Joux’s tripartite Diffle-Hellman key agreement
[8, 9] and a blind signature scheme [4, 12] to con
struct our proposed scheme. The aim of this basic
scheme is to eliminate the need of any secure chan
nel.

3.1 M odel
As mentioned in [2], to avoid a complete trust to
a single P K G , multiple P K G s can be employed.
In our model, we strictly use two PK G s, namely
P K G q and PK G \. We assume that both P K G s
do not collude against the user.
In the key extraction algorithm, each user vis
its each P K G to obtain his/her partial secret keys.
The secret keys are delivered via a public channel
(and hence, no secret channel is required). Only the
user, who can retrieve the secret key, can use the
secret key in any ID-based cryptosystem.
Remarks: Though our scheme does not need se
cret channel, in practice we may still want to employ
such a channel for simplicity.

3.2 The Scheme
The system parameter for the scheme is identi
cal to Boneh-Franklin’s scheme, namely (G i,G 2,e,
q ,P ,P pub,F ,H ), which is publicly available. Each
P K G selects a secret key Si 6 Z * and computes
Ppub, = &iP
for i = 0,1. Hence, the tuple (P, Ppubo, Ppu^) is
part of the system parameter to replace (P, Ppub)
in a single P K G setting. Define an additional hash
function h : G2 —> Z *. Hence, the complete system
parameter is (G 1,G 2,e ,q ,P ,P pubo,P publ,F ,H ,h ).
K e y Extraction A lgo rith m
There are three steps in this algorithm.
Step 1.
Let ID denote a user’s uniquely identifiable identity.
The user performs the following.
1. Select a random r G Z*.
2. Compute R = rP .
3. Send ID and R to the P K G i.

Step 2.

Upon each user’s visit, the P K G i, i = 0,1, will
perform the following.
1. Compute Q = -F(ID), where Q £ Gi, and Q is
the user’s unique ID-based public key.
2. Compute the user’s secret key as
<S|D = h(e(P Pubie i,R ) Si) ■SiQ
3. Send iS|*D to the user via a public channel (note
that this value can be just broadcasted).
Step 3.

After visiting both PK G s, the user obtains two se
cret keys namely S(q and iS/p, where

and
The authenticity of the partial secret key <S(D can
be verified by testing whether

^ ID + 5 D
h (e (P pubo, P publ) r )

to obtain his secret key. The user’s secret key is of
the form
<Sid = s0Q + sxQ
Correctness.

The correctness of the secret key extraction is jus
tified as follows.

_

^ ID + 5 b
h (e (P pubo, P publ) r )

10

h(e(P, P ) s°sir) • s0Q + h(e(P, P ) SoSir)siQ
~

Th eorem 1 Our proposed key extraction algorithm
does not require the existence of any secure channel.
Proof. The partial secret key provided by each
P K G i is in the form of

p^ V )

holds with equality. I f both partial signatures are
authenticated, then the user will compute

£

— Decrypt. Let C = (U, V ) be a cipher
text received by Bob. To decrypt C us
ing his private key <S|d, Bob computes
V (B H (e (S lD,U )).

3.3 Security Analysis

S|D = h(e{Ppubo, R ) Sl) ■ siQ

S in =

— Encrypt. To send an encrypted message
to Bob, Alice first obtains the system pa
rameter and Alice’s identity to compute
Q = E(ID). Then, to encrypt a mes
sage m £ {0, l } n, Bob picks s £ Z q and
computes gtD = e(Q, sPpubo + sPpubl) and
C = (sP ,m © H(g\o)). The ciphertext is
C = (s P ,m ® H{g\o)).

The correctness of the decryption algorithm is ob
vious and hence, it is omitted.

<S|°D = h(e (P publ, R ) So) ■ s0Q

e(StD, P ) = e(Q ,Ppubi) h^ p^

• To illustrate the encryption algorithm in
Boneh-Franklin’s IBE, the encryption and de
cryption algorithms are defined as follows.

h ( e ( P , P ) s°si r )

<5|b = h(e(P Pubim , R ) Si) ■SiQ
The only participant who can derive the partial se
cret key SiQ from <S|*D is only the user who knows
r, where R = rP . This is due to Joux’s tripartite
Diffle-Hellman key agreement [8], Hence, no secure
channel is required.
I
Lem m a 1 In our first scheme, each P K G can per
form key escrow to the user’s secret key.
Proof. The partial secret key is derived from a tri
partite key agreement among P K G o, P K G i and
the user. Hence, when P K G o sends the user’s par
tial secret key <S|°D, P K G i can always obtain this
partial secret key as well. We will show how to
eliminate this problem in our second scheme.
I
Th eorem 2 Our key extraction algorithm is unforgeahle if DHBDH problem is hard.

h { e ( P , P y ° s' r )(soQ + SlQ)
h(e{P, P ) s°si r )

=

s0Q + «iQ

=

(so + «i)Q
I

Rem arks:
• We note that the secret key obtained from our
extraction algorithm can be used in any other
ID-based system that has similar structure,
such as Boneh-Franklin’s IBE system, with re
spect to the public key P puba and Ppubl.

Proof. To show the unforgability of our scheme, let
us assume there is an attacker A who obtains the
partial key extraction from the P K G and success
fully retrieves the partial secret key without know
ing either the P K G s ’ secret keys nor the user’s se
cret key. We will show how to construct an algo
rithm B that will invoke the attacker A in the sim
ulation. The purpose of B is to solve an instance of
DHBDH problem.
For clarity of the presentation, let us recall the
ability of the attacker A together with the goal of

the algorithm B. Having received a partial secret
key <S|*D, where
^id = h(e{Ppubimi,R ) St) • SiQ
A can derive s^Q without knowing any of the secret
key involved. The purpose of the algorithm B is to

3. Compute the user’s secret key as
= h(e(Ti, R )s') ■SiQ
4. Send iS|lD and T) to the user via a public channel
(these values can be just broadcasted).
Step 3.
After visiting both PK G s, the user obtains two se
cret keys namely S°D and <S|q, where

decide whether r = h(e(P, P )abc) holds for the tuple
(aP, bP, cP, r), where a, b,c,r € Z*. The simulation
is as follows.
Preparation.
B prepares the public keys of the P K G s as Ppub0 =
aP and Pvub1 = bP. Then, the public parameter
(Gi, G2, e, q, P, Ppubo, Ppubi, F, H ) is provided to A.
Key Extraction.
To simulate the key extraction, B computes

together with To and T\. The authenticity of the
partial secret key <S|*D can be verified by testing
whether

S = r •R

e(Sjb,P) = e(Q,PPubi)h{i(Ti'P^ )r)

where R G
is chosen randomly. Then, B sends
S together with cP to A. Receiving S, cP from B,
A can output 5, where
s

*
h(e(P, P ) abc) '

<Sl0D = h(e(T0,R )so)-soQ and

5l1
D = ft(e(Ti,J2)ai) - a 1Q

holds with equality. If both partial signatures are
valid, then the user will compute
o
10

£lb
|
§ d______
h(e(To, PpuboY)
h(e(T1,P publY )

to obtain his complete secret key. The user’s secret
key is of the form

Then, B will perform the following.
?
• If 5 = R holds, then output “yes” , to indicate
that r = h(e(P, P ) abc) holds with equality.
• Otherwise, output “no” .
The success probability of B is the same as A.
Hence, we obtain the contradiction and complete
the proof.
I

4 The Second Scheme: R e
m oving the K ey Escrow
In this section, we extend our basic scheme to re
move the ability of each P K G to derive the user’s
partial secret key during the partial key extrac
tion, and hence, the key escrowing problem can be
eliminated. The scheme is very similar to our first
scheme mentioned in the previous section, with sev
eral modifications as follows.
K e y E xtraction A lgo rith m
There are three steps in this algorithm.
Step 1. The same as our first scheme.
Step 2.
Upon each user’s visit, the P K G i, i = 0,1, will
perform the following.
1. Compute Q = E(ID), where Q G Gi, and Q is
the user’s unique ID-based public key.
2. Select a random point T)

G

Gi.

*5id = soQ + siQ

4.1 Security A nalysis
Th eorem 3 Our second scheme does not permit
each P K G to reveal the partial secret key sent by
the other P K G .
Proof. Unlike our first scheme, our second scheme
removes the ability of the other P K G to read the
partial secret key sent over the public channel. This
is due to the use of two randomly chosen points by
each P K G .
I
T h eorem 4 Our second scheme is unforgeable iff
DBDH problem is hard.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of
Theorem 2 and therefore it is omitted.
I
Remarks:
• In our second scheme, each P K G cannot re
trieve the user’s partial secret key (and hence,
the complete secret key). However, it was
noted in [13] that key escrow is sometimes
needed, for instance under a court order. In
our scheme, we assume that the P K G s will not
collude against the user. Nevertheless, under
a court order, both P K G s can be called upon
and hence, they can cooperatively decrypt a ci
phertext to recover the required plaintext that
is encrypted using the private key (in the IBE
scheme).

4.2 Extension to M ultiple PKGs
It is easy to see that our second scheme can be eas
ily extended to support more than two PK G s. The
idea is illustrated as follows. During the key extrac
tion algorithm, each P K G i will compute the user’s
secret key as

SiD = h(e(Ti,Ry')-8iQ
for a random T; e Gi, and finally send 5d and Ti
to the user via a public channel. After collecting
the partial secret keys from n PK G s, the user can
retrieve his/her public key by computing

S 'D = % H e ( T u P PubiY Y
The computed secret key can be verified as follows
n

e(S|D,-P) = E [e(Q ,P p u6i)
where Ppub, denotes the P K G i s public key.

5 Conclusion
In an ID-based cryptography, key extraction algo
rithm assumes that the P K G is trusted and can
always perform key-escrow. Additionally, a secure
channel between the P K G and the user is required
during the key extraction algorithm. In this paper,
we firstly proposed a key extraction algorithm that
overcomes these two limitations. We provide our
security proof under a standard assumption.
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